I rarely comment on discussions of interpretants, because nobody, not even Peirce, had a complete, coherent, and decisive theory of interpretants. Perhaps some Peirce scholars have developed theories that go beyond what Peirce wrote. That is possible, but nobody can claim that their theories are what Peirce himself had intended.
On these issues, I recommend the article by Albert Atkin in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, first version in 2006 and major update in 2022: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/
Atkin has a thorough list of references for anybody who intends to study this topic. See below for some quotations from the end of the article that show how incomplete, indefinite, and uncertain Peirce's own writings happen to be.
I don't want to discourage anybody from discussing interpretants. But since Peirce himself was uncertain and indecisive, nobody can claim that their interpretation is what Peirce had intended.
John
_______________
As is common with all of Peirce’s work in philosophy, various changes in terminology and subtleties with accompanying neologisms occur from one piece of work to the next. His work on interpretants is no different. At various points in his final accounts of signs, Peirce describes the division of interpretants as being: immediate, dynamic and final; or as emotional, energetic, and logical; or as naïve, rogate and normal; or as intentional, effective and communicational; or even destinate, effective and explicit. As Liszka (1990, 20) notes, “the received view in Peirce scholarship suggests that the divisions of interpretant into immediate, dynamic, and final are archetypal, all other divisions being relatively synonymous with these categories.” There are, however, some dissenters from this view.
In discussing the interpretant, Peirce describes one of the trichotomies above as follows:
In all cases [the Interpretant] includes feelings; for there must, at least, be a sense of comprehending the meaning of the sign. If it includes more than mere feeling, it must evoke some kind of effort. It may include something besides, which, for the present, may be vaguely called “thought”. I term these three kinds of interpretant the “emotional”, the “energetic”, and the “logical” interpretants. (EP2. 409). . .
Peirce describes the dynamic interpretant as deriving its character from action (CP8 .315 1904), but later says, “action cannot be a logical interpretant” (CP5 .491 1906). This seems to make the two inconsistent. (See Liszka (1990, 21) for more on the problems with Fitzgerald’s claim). Moreover, this inconsistency seems to suggest a problem for Short’s view since his account also suggests that the dynamic interpretant should include the logical interpretant as a subdivision (Short 1981, 213). Short, however, claims textual support for his own view from instances where Peirce mentions the emotional/energetic/logical trichotomy alongside the apparently separate claim that signs have three interpretants. (Short sites (CP8 .333 1904) and (CP4 .536 1906). Short takes this as suggesting that the two should be treated as different and distinct trichotomies. (Short 2004, 235).
How far the textual evidence on the matter will prove decisive is unclear, especially given the fragmentary nature of Peirce’s final work on signs. However, one or two things militate in favor of the “received view”. First, Peirce is notorious for experimenting with terminology, especially when trying to pin down his own ideas, or describe the same phenomenon from different angles. Second, it is unclear why trichotomies like the intentional/effectual/communicational should count as terminological experiments whilst the emotional/energetic/logical counts as a distinct division. And finally, there is little provision in Peirce’s projected sixty-six classes of signs for the kind of additional classifications imposed by further subdivisions of the interpretant. (For more on this discussion see, Liszka 1990 and 1996; Fitzgerald 1966; Lalor 1997; Short 1981, 1996, and 2004).
Helmut, list
Yes, Popper’s rejection of idealism - as in Plato’s ‘ideal primal state of Forms’ and Hegel’s ideal final state is expressed in numerous places - and clearly in that quote from 6.348. And - his rejection of Marxist determinism and necessity - in favour of the realities of chance [ Firstness] and the creativity of Thirdness, or the self-generation of new habits.
Yes, Popper was well aware of Peirce. In his book Objective Knowledge,[Oxford UP, 1972] Popper references Peirce quite frequently, and called him “one of the greatest philosophers of all time] [212]. And says that his own “indeterminist view of the world” [296] .. is similar to that of Charles Sanders Peirce [ ibid].
In fact, Popper’s Three World Theory. [outlined in Objective Knowledge] has strong relations to Peirces’ Three Modes. His World 1 is the basic physical world; his World 2 is the world of individual subjective experience; his world 3 is the world of common objective thought. I consider that Peirce’s modes are superior to this outline - but-…obviously- the similarities are there.
Edwina
> On Jan 29, 2024, at 10:03 AM, Helmut Raulien <H.Raulien(a)gmx.de> wrote:
>
>
> Edwina, John, List,
>
> I have read the two books by Karl Popper: "The open society and its enemies" (Thank you for recommending me!), and, as far as I am competent, completely agree with Popper. He is against "historicism", and both refutes Platon (ideal primal state), and Hegel (ideal final state). About Marx, he approves his analysis of the situation at Marx´ time, but refutes his prophecies, and therefore his claim, that there "scienttific"ly is a necessity in history. History is just stories. I wonder, whether Popper knew Peirce, because I see some parallelity.
>
> Best, Helmut
>
> Gesendet: Sonntag, 28. Januar 2024 um 21:33 Uhr
> Von: "Edwina Taborsky" <taborsky(a)primus.ca>
> An: sowa(a)bestweb.net
> Cc: "Peirce List" <peirce-l(a)list.iupui.edu>, "CG" <cg(a)lists.iccs-conference.org>
> Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Concluding section 7 of the article on phaneroscopy
> John, list
>
> Thanks for the chapter. I particularly liked your inclusion off the Peircean quote;
>
> Get rid, thoughtful Reader, of the Okhamistic prejudice of political partisanship that in thought, in being, and in development the indefinite is due to a degeneration from a primal state of perfect definiteness. The truth is rather on the side of the Scholastic realists that the unsettled is the primal state, and that definiteness and determinateness, the two poles of settledness, are, in the large, approximations, developmentally, epistemologically, and metaphysically. (CP 6.348)
>
>
> This clarifies that neither the primal state nor the ‘final state’ [ of there be such a state] is ‘perfect definiteness’. Instead, both are unsettled’. How could it be otherwise? Without such indefiniteness, no adaptation or evolution could occur, and the laws of physics would lead to inevitable dissipation of energy/matter. To prevent this- and thus enable ever more complex forms, ‘indefiniteness’ on both sides, is the answer.
>
> Edwina.
>
>
> On Jan 27, 2024, at 11:27 PM, John F Sowa <sowa(a)bestweb.net> wrote:
>
>
>
> I finally finished the article on phaneroscopy and sent it off to the publisher. The final Section 7 is attached. It shows that Peirce's writings in the last decade of his life are at the forefront of ongoing research in the cognitive sciences (philosophy, psychology, linguistics, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, and anthropology).
>
> At the end, I include links to a few other articles that go into more detail about current issues and the importance of Peirce's insights.
>
> John
> <Section7.pdf>_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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I finally finished the article on phaneroscopy and sent it off to the publisher. The final Section 7 is attached. It shows that Peirce's writings in the last decade of his life are at the forefront of ongoing research in the cognitive sciences (philosophy, psychology, linguistics, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, and anthropology).
At the end, I include links to a few other articles that go into more detail about current issues and the importance of Peirce's insights.
John
Jon, Helmut, List,
I don't disagree with your analysis. But what it shows is that abstract analysis provides zero information about any particular case.
Peirce revolutionized the field of logic, he made major contributions to methods of reasoning, to methods of analysis and to methods of representation in lexicography, phaneroscopy, semeiotic, and, scientific research (methodeutic). His 10 classes of signs are important, but beyond that, he could only give a few examples, and he never showed the value of that abstract analysis with any concrete results for any kind of application.
Fortunately, Lady Welby had an enormous influence on Peirce. She had zero interest in those abstractions. In evaluating the importance of Peirce's late writings, it's essential to read his letters to her. She kept him focused on reality.
It's not an accident that Peirce dropped the word 'phenomenology' and replaced it with 'phaneroscopy', which puts more emphasis on concrete examples, rather than formal analysis. In his last decade, his examples and methods of analysis show a strong influence of Welby's interests and subject matter. He kept working on EGs, but he used them to represent subjects that are more concrete than abstract -- he kept that goal of representing images, especially stereoscopic moving images.
Although Welby did not understand EGs, I believe that she kept him focused on representing imagery. And I believe that the importance of imagery is the reason why he replaced the trichotomy of word oriented rheme-dicisign-arguent with the more general trichotomy that included imagery: seme-pheme-delome.
John
----------------------------------------
From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschmidt(a)gmail.com>
Helmut, List:
HR: it is the interpreter, who does the inference ... it is the interpreter, who receives the sign, and then forms the interpretant
As I have said before, this is true in the sense that the interpreter's mind is another sign, which co-determines the dynamical interpretant along with the individual sign being analyzed. That is why the same individual sign can have different dynamical interpretants--different interpreters have different collateral experience and different habits of interpretation. Any dynamical interpretant of an individual sign (the effect that it actually does have) is a misinterpretation to the extent that it deviates from the final interpretant of that sign (the effect that it ideally would have), which obviously must be consistent with its immediate interpretant (the range of effects that it possibly could have). The proper aim of inquiry in accordance with the normative science of logic as semeiotic is conforming all our dynamical interpretants of signs to their final interpretants, i.e., adopting only true beliefs such that the corresponding habits of conduct would never be confounded by any possible future experience.
HR: The sign anyway is prescinded from the, in reality not reducible, sign triad. ... Prescission might be seen as an error, so this is error propagation.
Again, in my view, each individual genuine triadic relation with its three individual correlates is prescinded from the continuous process of semiosis. Prescission should not be seen as an error--it "consists in supposing a state of things in which one element is present without the other, the one being logically possible without the other" (EP 2:270, 1903). We can suppose an individual sign with its individual object and its individual interpretant being present, apart from other signs with their own objects and interpretants, because these are all entia rationis--"fictions recognized to be fictions, and thus no longer fictions" (R 295, 1906). As an engineer, I routinely employ prescission to create diagrams of buildings that include only their primary members and connections, omitting everything else that is really present but incidental to their structural behavior. Such a model is not erroneous as long as it adequately captures every aspect that is significant for the analysis being performed (https://www.structuremag.org/?p=10373).
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Wed, Jan 24, 2024 at 9:13 AM Helmut Raulien <H.Raulien(a)gmx.de> wrote:
Jon, Cecile, List,
Jon, in your first paragraph you wrote about inference. I agree. Therefore I find it a bit problematic to say, that the sign determines the interpretant, because the sign doesn´t infere, it is the interpreter, who does the inference. But ok, I guess we might say, that Peirce prescinds the semiosis from the interpreter, so, ok, the flow of determination goes from the sign to the interpretant, because it is the interpreter, who receives the sign, and then forms the interpretant, and, if you donot mention the interpreter, well, then you just skip her/him/it. But I think, that this skipping is only justified, if the interpretant is true, because then it (the interpretant) is a subset of the final interpretant, and not a misinterpretation. But: Can we take that for granted?
Talking about precission: The sign anyway is prescinded from the, in reality not reducible, sign triad. If we say, that something prescinded determines something else, this determination too is prescinded. Prescission might be seen as an error, so this is error propagation. That, i guess, is the reason, why this whole determination affair is somehow confusing. It surely is, if we take "determination" too literally, I mean, if we take it too muchly for real. Do you agree? You see, I have been trying very hard to not contradict Peirce.
Best, Helmut
The Second International Measuring Ontologies for Value Enhancement Workshop (MOVE 2024)
Call for Papers and Presentations (Online)
Date
14-15 June 2024 (two days)
Venue
This virtual event is organised by the International Laboratory for Endeavour Architecture (ILEnA) in conjunction with the DigiSAS Lab, School of Computer Science, University of Technology Sydney, Australia.
About
The MOVE (Measuring Ontologies for Value Enhancement) is a community of academic researchers and industrial practitioners that aim to inspire research, discussion, and tools to achieve value from ontologies by measuring their impact in all fields. These measures would identify where there are gaps and overlaps within and across ontologies and the extent to which they are applied in multiple disciplines towards a holistic general ontology. For example, contemporary enterprise architecture frameworks contain ontologies through their metamodels but exclude measures that address sustainability and the circular economy. If we are to bring computer productivity that the automation of ontologies can offer to all human endeavours, then we need to MOVE them.
The first MOVE workshop led to the peer-reviewed “Measuring Ontologies for Value Enhancement: Aligning Computing Productivity with Human Creativity for Societal Adaptation<https://link.springer.com/book/9783031222290>” publication by Springer CCIS in 2022. That publication contained selected and extended papers from the inaugural MOVE workshop. We identified the present-day challenges for MOVE, extending into multifaceted areas such as the separation of fake versus actual knowledge, fair knowledge sharing, advancement of knowledge-sharing methods, and tools to put the specialised knowledge pieces together. We covered:
* the complexity of knowledge-intensive societal endeavours, particularly on the dynamics of these systems
* methods for modelling ontologies, recognising inconsistent ontologies, creating ontologies of explanations
* creating ontologies for worldviews to advance (digital) ontologies for the humanities
* enterprise ontologies, extending enterprise architecture
* endeavour architecture for broader societal adaption and modelling of involved agents and agencies, their intelligence and formal concepts
* tools to MOVE enterprise architecture development with formal concept analysis and strategy ontology
* knowledge discovery and innovations through collaboration tools that facilitated knowledge mapping and knowledge discovery, and collaboration for sensemaking and innovations
* trusted data sources to advance research on social determinants, inequalities, and the underuse of social prescriptions for mental health
* case studies such as the domain ontology of FinTech and how it may be shared with the broadest audience
Submissions
We, therefore, invite submissions that promote MOVE from the following areas:
* artificial intelligence, general and domain-specific
* case studies or histories
* bringing computer productivity to individual or organisational human creativity
* communication theories and practices
* conceptual graphs, formal concept analysis, or other conceptual structures
* data infrastructures
* data, information, knowledge, and wisdom space
* enterprise and endeavour architectures
* ethical theories and moral practices
* government services
* industry or third-sector applications
* knowledge graphs, linked data graphs, or enterprise data graphs
* large language models
* modelling theories and practices
* ontology theories and practices
* philosophical foundations
* neuroscience and phycology relevant for AI
* semantics
* semiotics
* societal adaption
* systems theories and practices
* value inquiry
* vocabularies, taxonomy, and ontology
* web-based, cloud, mobile, or other software tools
* user experiences
* any other area relevant to MOVE
The submissions may include proposals, in-progress research, scientific results, tools, industrial practices, or other artefacts to stimulate productive and interactive discussions during the workshop. Each submission must have a paper of up to 8 pages (excluding references) intended for presentation at the workshop. Please adhere to the format and guidelines provided by the Artificial Intelligence and Applications (AIA) journal, available at https://ojs.bonviewpress.com/index.php/AIA/about/submissions
All submissions must be original work, and authors must certify copyright ownership.
Submission System
Please send all your submissions and correspondence to MOVE(a)sysaffairs.org<mailto:MOVE@sysaffairs.org>
Proceedings
Workshop papers and presentations will be published online with open access by ILEnA.
Selected and extended papers from the workshop will be published in a peer-reviewed special MOVE volume of the Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Applications (AIA). Authors may choose to assert their Open Access and Retention Rights. Authors of the selected papers will not be required to pay any fees. Information about the AIA journal can be found here: https://ojs.bonviewpress.com/index.php/AIA/index
Deadline
April 30th, 2024
Organisers
Rubina Polovina, Systems Affairs, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Simon Polovina, Sheffield Hallam University, Sheffield, UK
Neil Kemp, Kemp & Associates Inc., Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
Ivan Launders, BT, UK
Asif Gill, DigiSAS Lab, School of Computer Science, University of Technology Sydney, Australia
Program Committee
Matt Baxter, Polypipe, Doncaster, UK
Jamie Caine, Sheffield Hallam University, Sheffield, UK
Giulia Felappi, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK
David Jakobsen, Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark
Anant Jani, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
Aidin Kerem, Ontario Public Service, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Wim Paul Remi Laurier, Université Saint-Louis, Brussels, Belgium
Pana Lepeniotis, Data Clarity Ltd, Nottingham, England, UK
Aldo De Moor, Community Sense, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Suzana Stojakovic-Celustka, InfoSet, Zagreb, Croatia
Ragupathi Sundararaj, Ontario Public Service, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Dr Simon Polovina, Department of Computing, Sheffield Hallam University
Cantor Building, 153 Arundel St, Sheffield, UK S1 2NU
Web: www.shu.ac.uk/about-us/our-people/staff-profiles/simon-polovina<http://www.shu.ac.uk/about-us/our-people/staff-profiles/simon-polovina> │ www.polovina.me.uk<http://www.polovina.me.uk/>
Email: S.Polovina(a)shu.ac.uk<mailto:S.Polovina@shu.ac.uk>
Survey of Definition and Determination • 3
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/01/24/survey-of-definition-and-determin…
All,
In the early 1990s, “in the middle of life's journey” as the saying goes,
I returned to grad school in a systems engineering program with the idea
of taking a more systems-theoretic approach to my development of Peircean
themes, from signs and scientific inquiry to logic and information theory.
Two of the first questions calling for fresh examination were the closely
related concepts of definition and determination, not only as Peirce used
them in his logic and semiotics but as researchers in areas as diverse as
computer science, cybernetics, physics, and systems science would find
themselves forced to reconsider the concepts in later years. That led me
to collect a sample of texts where Peirce and a few other writers discuss
the issues of definition and determination. There are copies of those
selections at the following sites.
Collection Of Source Materials
• https://oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey/EXCERPTS
Excerpts on Definition
• https://oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey/EXCERPTS#Definition
Excerpts on Determination
• https://oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey/EXCERPTS#Determination
What follows is a Survey of blog and wiki posts on Definition and Determination,
with a focus on the part they play in Peirce's interlinked theories of signs,
information, and inquiry. In classical logical traditions the concepts of
definition and determination are closely related and their bond acquires
all the more force when we view the overarching concept of constraint from
an information-theoretic point of view, as Peirce did beginning in the 1860s.
Regards,
Jon
cc: https://www.academia.edu/community/lzPvjV
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