27 Jan
2024
27 Jan
'24
7:08 p.m.
Interpreter and Interpretant • Selection 1
• http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/01/27/interpreter-and-interpretant-selec…
All,
Questions about the relation between “interpreters” and “interpretants”
in Peircean semiotics have broken out again. To put the matter as
pointedly as possible, because I know someone or other is bound to —
In a theory of three‑place relations among objects, signs, and
interpretant signs, where indeed is there any place for the
interpretive agent?
By way of getting my feet on the ground with the issue I'll do
what always helped me before and review a small set of basic texts.
Here is the first.
Figure 1. The Sign Relation in Aristotle
•
https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/awbrey-awbrey-1995-e…
❝Words spoken are symbols or signs (symbola) of affections or impressions
(pathemata) of the soul (psyche); written words are the signs of words
spoken. As writing, so also is speech not the same for all races of men.
But the mental affections themselves, of which these words are primarily
signs (semeia), are the same for the whole of mankind, as are also the
objects (pragmata) of which those affections are representations or
likenesses, images, copies (homoiomata).❞ (De Interp. i. 16a4).
References —
Aristotle, “On Interpretation” (De Interp.), Harold P. Cooke (trans.),
pp. 111–179 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William
Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.
Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (1995), “Interpretation as Action : The Risk
of Inquiry”, Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 15(1), 40–52.
•
https://web.archive.org/web/20001210162300/http://chss.montclair.edu/inquir…
• https://www.pdcnet.org/inquiryct/content/inquiryct_1995_0015_0001_0040_0052
• https://www.academia.edu/1266493/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inqui…
• https://www.academia.edu/57812482/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inqu…
Regards,
Jon
cc: https://www.academia.edu/community/5wYa3L
cc: https://mathstodon.xyz/@Inquiry/111829392534115897
28 Jan
28 Jan
8:45 p.m.
Interpreter and Interpretant • Selection 2
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/01/28/interpreter-and-interpretant-sele…
All,
In the next passage up for review the hypostatic abstraction
of a person to conduct the movement of signs is described by
Peirce as a Sop to Cerberus, a rhetorical gambit set to
side‑step a persistent difficulty of exposition.
❝It is clearly indispensable to start with an accurate and broad
analysis of the nature of a Sign. I define a Sign as anything which
is so determined by something else, called its Object, and so determines
an effect upon a person, which effect I call its Interpretant, that the
latter is thereby mediately determined by the former. My insertion of
“upon a person” is a sop to Cerberus, because I despair of making my own
broader conception understood.❞ (Peirce 1908, Selected Writings, p. 404).
Reference —
Peirce, C.S. (1908), “Letters to Lady Welby”, Chapter 24, pp. 380–432
in Charles S. Peirce : Selected Writings (Values in a Universe of Chance),
Edited with Introduction and Notes by Philip P. Wiener, Dover Publications,
New York, NY, 1966.
Resource —
Hypostatic Abstraction
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/08/08/hypostatic-abstraction/
Regards,
Jon
cc: https://www.academia.edu/community/54qeRV
cc: https://mathstodon.xyz/@Inquiry/111829392534115897
30 Jan
30 Jan
9 p.m.
Interpreter and Interpretant • Selection 3
• http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/01/30/interpreter-and-interpretant-selec…
All,
The following selection from Peirce's “Lowell Lectures
on the Logic of Science” (1866) lays out in detail his
“metaphorical argument” for the relationship between
interpreters and interpretant signs.
❝I think we need to reflect upon the circumstance that every word
implies some proposition or, what is the same thing, every word,
concept, symbol has an equivalent term — or one which has become
identified with it, — in short, has an “interpretant”.
❝Consider, what a word or symbol is; it is a sort of representation.
Now a representation is something which stands for something. I will not
undertake to analyze, this evening, this conception of standing for something —
but, it is sufficiently plain that it involves the standing to something for
something. A thing cannot stand for something without standing to something
for that something. Now, what is this that a word stands to? Is it a person?
❝We usually say that the word “homme” stands to a Frenchman for “man”.
It would be a little more precise to say that it stands to the Frenchman's
mind — to his memory. It is still more accurate to say that it addresses
a particular remembrance or image in that memory. And what “image”, what
remembrance? Plainly, the one which is the mental equivalent of the word
“homme” — in short, its interpretant. Whatever a word addresses then or
stands to, is its interpretant or identified symbol. …
❝The interpretant of a term, then, and that which it stands to are identical.
Hence, since it is of the very essence of a symbol that it should stand to
something, every symbol — every word and every “conception” — must have an
interpretant — or what is the same thing, must have information or implication.❞
(Peirce 1866, Chronological Edition 1, pp. 466–467).
Reference —
Peirce, C.S. (1866), “The Logic of Science, or, Induction and Hypothesis”,
Lowell Lectures of 1866, pp. 357–504 in Writings of Charles S. Peirce :
A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857–1866, Peirce Edition Project,
Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
Resource —
Hypostatic Abstraction
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/08/08/hypostatic-abstraction/
Regards,
Jon
cc: https://www.academia.edu/community/LmDEeV
cc: https://mathstodon.xyz/@Inquiry/111829392534115897
11:22 p.m.
Jon,
That quotation from 1866 is very old. Many years later, he wrote or edited over 16,000
words as an associate editor of the Century Dictionary. He learned very well that nearly
every word has a large number of word senses. The only words that have a single sense are
words that were deliberately coined and standardized for some branch of science or
engineering. And even in science, the word senses evolve as the theories develop.
It's more correct to say that a sign mark or sign object can have an open ended range
of interpretants that are determined by the context of the text or conversation and the
intentions of the speaker. And the sign interpreter may have a different interpretation
of the context and different intentions in mind. Therefore, misunderstandings are
frequent, and some discussion may be necessary to determine an interpretation that speaker
and listener can agree to.
Lady Welby had a very strong influence on Peirce's late writings. She stated very
clearly that words do not have a fixed meaning, and Peirce's correspondence with her
is essential for interpreting his late writings (from 1904 to 1913).
John
----------------------------------------
From: "Jon Awbrey" <jawbrey(a)att.net>
Subject: [CG] Re: Interpreter and Interpretant
Interpreter and Interpretant • Selection 3
• http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/01/30/interpreter-and-interpretant-selec…
All,
The following selection from Peirce's “Lowell Lectures
on the Logic of Science” (1866) lays out in detail his
“metaphorical argument” for the relationship between
interpreters and interpretant signs.
❝I think we need to reflect upon the circumstance that every word
implies some proposition or, what is the same thing, every word,
concept, symbol has an equivalent term — or one which has become
identified with it, — in short, has an “interpretant”.
❝Consider, what a word or symbol is; it is a sort of representation.
Now a representation is something which stands for something. I will not
undertake to analyze, this evening, this conception of standing for something —
but, it is sufficiently plain that it involves the standing to something for
something. A thing cannot stand for something without standing to something
for that something. Now, what is this that a word stands to? Is it a person?
❝We usually say that the word “homme” stands to a Frenchman for “man”.
It would be a little more precise to say that it stands to the Frenchman's
mind — to his memory. It is still more accurate to say that it addresses
a particular remembrance or image in that memory. And what “image”, what
remembrance? Plainly, the one which is the mental equivalent of the word
“homme” — in short, its interpretant. Whatever a word addresses then or
stands to, is its interpretant or identified symbol. …
❝The interpretant of a term, then, and that which it stands to are identical.
Hence, since it is of the very essence of a symbol that it should stand to
something, every symbol — every word and every “conception” — must have an
interpretant — or what is the same thing, must have information or implication.❞
(Peirce 1866, Chronological Edition 1, pp. 466–467).
Reference —
Peirce, C.S. (1866), “The Logic of Science, or, Induction and Hypothesis”,
Lowell Lectures of 1866, pp. 357–504 in Writings of Charles S. Peirce :
A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857–1866, Peirce Edition Project,
Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
Resource —
Hypostatic Abstraction
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/08/08/hypostatic-abstraction/
Regards,
Jon
cc: https://www.academia.edu/community/LmDEeV
cc: https://mathstodon.xyz/@Inquiry/111829392534115897
31 Jan
31 Jan
11 p.m.
Interpreter and Interpretant • Selection 4
• http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/01/31/interpreter-and-interpretant-selec…
Interpretation and Inquiry —
To illustrate the role of sign relations in inquiry
we begin with Dewey's elegant and simple example of
reflective thinking in everyday life.
❝A man is walking on a warm day. The sky was clear the last time
he observed it; but presently he notes, while occupied primarily
with other things, that the air is cooler. It occurs to him that
it is probably going to rain; looking up, he sees a dark cloud
between him and the sun, and he then quickens his steps.
❝What, if anything, in such a situation can be called thought?
Neither the act of walking nor the noting of the cold is a thought.
Walking is one direction of activity; looking and noting are other
modes of activity. The likelihood that it will rain is, however,
something suggested. The pedestrian feels the cold; he thinks of
clouds and a coming shower.❞ (John Dewey, How We Think, 6–7)
In Dewey's narrative we can identify the characters of the sign relation
as follows. Coolness is a Sign of the Object rain, and the Interpretant
is the thought of the rain's likelihood. In his description of reflective
thinking Dewey distinguishes two phases, “a state of perplexity, hesitation,
doubt” and “an act of search or investigation” (p. 9), comprehensive stages
which are further refined in his later model of inquiry.
Reflection is the action the interpreter takes to establish a fund
of connections between the sensory shock of coolness and the objective
danger of rain by way of the impression rain is likely. But reflection
is more than irresponsible speculation. In reflection the interpreter
acts to charge or defuse the thought of rain by seeking other signs the
thought implies and evaluating the thought according to the results of
that search.
Figure 2 shows the semiotic relationships involved in Dewey's story, tracing
the structure and function of the sign relation as it informs the activity of
inquiry, including both the movements of surprise explanation and intentional
action. The labels on the outer edges of the sign‑relational triple suggest
the significance of signs for eventual occurrences and the correspondence of
ideas with external orientations. But there is nothing essential about the
dyadic role distinctions they imply, as it is only in special or degenerate
cases that such projections preserve enough information to determine the
original sign relation.
Figure 2. Dewey's “Sign of Rain” Example
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/deweys-sign-of-rain-…
References —
Dewey, J. (1910), How We Think, D.C. Heath, Boston, MA.
Reprinted (1991), Prometheus Books, Buffalo, NY.
• https://www.gutenberg.org/files/37423/37423-h/37423-h.htm
Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (1995), “Interpretation as Action : The Risk
of Inquiry”, Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 15(1), 40–52.
•
https://web.archive.org/web/20001210162300/http://chss.montclair.edu/inquir…
• https://www.pdcnet.org/inquiryct/content/inquiryct_1995_0015_0001_0040_0052
• https://www.academia.edu/1266493/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inqui…
• https://www.academia.edu/57812482/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inqu…
Regards,
Jon
cc: https://www.academia.edu/community/LgvMJV
cc: https://mathstodon.xyz/@Inquiry/111829392534115897
1 Feb
1 Feb
1:24 p.m.
Jon,
Given your diagram of Dewey's example:
[image: image.png]
I don't see how the "event of rain" can be the object (O). The objects seem
more clearly to be the "air" and the "clouds" which in their coolness
and
darkness are being taken as signs (S). The "event of rain" is only included
in this situation via the interpretant (I), the "thought to the likelihood
of rain."
What's more, the ambiguity of this interpretant, being both a "thought of
the likelihood of rain" and the object, "rain," might be a clue to getting
at the nature of the interpretant in general as we move along?
Tom
On Wed, Jan 31, 2024 at 3:01 PM Jon Awbrey <jawbrey(a)att.net> wrote:
Interpreter and Interpretant • Selection 4
•
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/01/31/interpreter-and-interpretant-selec…
Interpretation and Inquiry —
To illustrate the role of sign relations in inquiry
we begin with Dewey's elegant and simple example of
reflective thinking in everyday life.
❝A man is walking on a warm day. The sky was clear the last time
he observed it; but presently he notes, while occupied primarily
with other things, that the air is cooler. It occurs to him that
it is probably going to rain; looking up, he sees a dark cloud
between him and the sun, and he then quickens his steps.
❝What, if anything, in such a situation can be called thought?
Neither the act of walking nor the noting of the cold is a thought.
Walking is one direction of activity; looking and noting are other
modes of activity. The likelihood that it will rain is, however,
something suggested. The pedestrian feels the cold; he thinks of
clouds and a coming shower.❞ (John Dewey, How We Think, 6–7)
In Dewey's narrative we can identify the characters of the sign relation
as follows. Coolness is a Sign of the Object rain, and the Interpretant
is the thought of the rain's likelihood. In his description of reflective
thinking Dewey distinguishes two phases, “a state of perplexity,
hesitation,
doubt” and “an act of search or investigation” (p. 9), comprehensive stages
which are further refined in his later model of inquiry.
Reflection is the action the interpreter takes to establish a fund
of connections between the sensory shock of coolness and the objective
danger of rain by way of the impression rain is likely. But reflection
is more than irresponsible speculation. In reflection the interpreter
acts to charge or defuse the thought of rain by seeking other signs the
thought implies and evaluating the thought according to the results of
that search.
Figure 2 shows the semiotic relationships involved in Dewey's story,
tracing
the structure and function of the sign relation as it informs the activity
of
inquiry, including both the movements of surprise explanation and
intentional
action. The labels on the outer edges of the sign‑relational triple
suggest
the significance of signs for eventual occurrences and the correspondence
of
ideas with external orientations. But there is nothing essential about the
dyadic role distinctions they imply, as it is only in special or degenerate
cases that such projections preserve enough information to determine the
original sign relation.
Figure 2. Dewey's “Sign of Rain” Example
•
https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/deweys-sign-of-rain-…
References —
Dewey, J. (1910), How We Think, D.C. Heath, Boston, MA.
Reprinted (1991), Prometheus Books, Buffalo, NY.
• https://www.gutenberg.org/files/37423/37423-h/37423-h.htm
Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (1995), “Interpretation as Action : The Risk
of Inquiry”, Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 15(1),
40–52.
•
https://web.archive.org/web/20001210162300/http://chss.montclair.edu/inquir…
•
https://www.pdcnet.org/inquiryct/content/inquiryct_1995_0015_0001_0040_0052
•
https://www.academia.edu/1266493/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inqui…
•
https://www.academia.edu/57812482/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inqu…
Regards,
Jon
cc: https://www.academia.edu/community/LgvMJV
cc: https://mathstodon.xyz/@Inquiry/111829392534115897
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